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Abstract  
This paper identifies the optimal pollution level under the assumptions of linear, 
quadratic and exponential damage and abatement cost functions and investigates 
analytically the certain restrictions that the existence of this optimal level requires. The 
evaluation of the benefit area is discussed and the mathematical formulation provides the 
appropriate methods, so that to be calculated. The positive, at least from a theoretical 
point of view, is that both the quadratic and the exponential case obey to the same form 
of evaluating the benefit area. These benefit area estimations can be used as indexes 
between different rival policies and depending on the environmental problem the policy 
that produces the maximum area will be the beneficial policy.  
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1.  Introduction 
 Rationality in the formulation and applicability of environmental policies depends 
on careful consideration of their consequences on the nature and on the society. For this 
reason it is important to quantify the costs and benefits in the most accurate way. But the 
validity of any cost benefit analysis (hereafter CBA) is ambiguous as the results may 
have large uncertainties. Uncertainty is present in all environmental problems and this 
makes clear the need for thoughtful policy design and evaluation. We may have 
uncertainty over the underlying physical or ecological processes, as well as over the 
economic consequences of the change in environmental quality. 
These sources of uncertainty and their impact on policy formulation may be 
represented by the non-linear nature of the damage and abatement cost functions. 
Damage or external costs can be estimated by an analysis of the chain of pollution 
emissions, their dispersion and “transportation”  (in cases of transboundary pollution like 
the acid rain problem), their effect measured among others with a dose-response function 
and their final (if feasible) monetary valuation. A similar picture is realized when 
referring to abatement costs, which may be less uncertain, compared to damage costs, but 
they are quite severe. The main problem in this case is related to technological change 
which may be essentially difficult to predict or sometimes even to characterize.  
  Uncertainty is obvious not only in the parameters’ estimation, but also in the 
choice of the appropriate model that “fits” the problem. To make parameters’ uncertainty 
clearer, we may thing in terms of the fitted model assumed for the damage and abatement 
curves in a regression analysis that “lies” between the upper and the lower bound of a 
 3 
95% confidence interval. That is there are two curves creating an interval of values for 
the fitted model and in this way uncertainty due to variation of the estimated coefficients. 
 As uncertainty may be due to the lack of appropriate abatement and damage cost 
data, we apply here a method of calibrating non-existing damage cost estimates relying 
on individual country abatement cost functions. In this way a “calibrated” Benefit Area 
(BAc) is estimated. Specifically, we try to identify the optimal pollution level under the 
assumptions of linear, quadratic and exponential abatement and damage cost functions. 
As far as the parameters are concerned the first two are linear while the third is a non-
linear function. That is we improve the work of Halkos and Kitsos (2005) extending the 
number of different model approximations of abatement and damage cost functions and 
thus the assumed correct model eliminates uncertainty about curve fitting. The target of 
this paper is to develop the appropriate theory whatever the model choice is. 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the background of 
the problem and reviews the relative existing literature. Section 3 identifies analytically 
the intersection of the marginal abatement cost curve (hereafter MAC) with the marginal 
damage cost curve (hereafter MD), in order to examine when and if an optimal pollution 
level exists. The existence of the intersection, despite the general belief, is not always 
true and the conditions are analytically examined here. In section 4 an empirical 
application for a sample of European countries, with different industrial structure, is 
presented. For these countries, the “calibrated” Benefit Area (BAc) is evaluated 
explicitly, provided there is an intersection of the MD and MAC functions. The last 
section concludes the paper and comments on the policy implications related to this 
analysis providing evidence useful to researchers and policy makers. 
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2. Background to the problem 
 Abatement and damage cost functions are highly non-linear and the precise shapes 
of the functions are unknown. At the same time, environmental policies are related with 
significant irreversibilities, which usually interact in a very complex way with uncertainty. 
This complexity becomes worse, if we think of the very long time periods that characterize 
environmental problems (Pindyck, 2007).  
 The damage cost function relates pollution and emissions of a specific pollutant. 
Damages are measured as the effect of these emissions on health, monuments, recreational 
activities, lakes, buildings etc. Efforts to measure the existence or other indirect use values 
are made with the help of contingent valuation and other methods (Halkos and Jones, 2012; 
Halkos and Matsiori, 2012; Bjornstad and Kahn, 1996; Freeman, 1993). As expected, the 
accurate measurement of damage is significant but also difficult due to many practical 
problems as presented in Farmer et al. (2001), Georgiou et al. (1997) and Barbier (1998).  
Uncertainties in the functions of damage and control costs influence the policy 
design in a number of ways (Halkos, 1996). The first effect is in terms of the choice of 
the appropriate policy instrument. Weitzman (1974), in his seminal paper, showed that in 
the presence of uncertainty in cost functions, the instrument choice depends on the slopes 
of the curves. In certainty conditions either instrument will be equally effective but in 
uncertainty the choice is important and depends on the slopes of the marginal damage and 
abatement cost curves. In the case of steep marginal damage and flat marginal control 
cost curves, quantity-based instruments are more adequate; while in the case of steep 
marginal abatement cost and flat marginal damage curves, a price-based instrument is to 
be chosen (Halkos, 2000). 
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A number of studies have extended the Weitzman’s thesis and showed that in the 
case of uncertainty “hybrid” policies of combining both instruments will dominate to the 
single instrument (Roberts and Spence, 1976; Weitzman, 1978; Pizer 2002; Jacoby and 
Ellerman, 2004).  
It is worth mentioning that uncertainty may also affect the optimal timing of 
policy implementation if there are sunk costs in the implementation of that policy or the 
environmental damage from the lack of any policy is at least partly irreversible. The 
consequences of irreversibility have been studied extensively in the literature (Pindyck 
2000, 2002; Fisher and Hanemann 1990; Gollier et al., 2000; Ulph and Ulph, 1997; 
Kolstad, 1996).  
As mentioned, damage and abatement cost functions seem to have a large 
curvature and in many cases to be non-linear functions. A number of studies have tried to 
assess the cause and extent the uncertainty over the benefits from emissions reduction1. 
Rabl et al. (2005) compare damage and abatement costs for a number of air pollutants. 
They distinguish between discrete and continuous policy choices. Setting a limit for 
sulphur dioxide emissions from power plants is an example of a continuous choice while 
the decision to demand a specific abatement method associated with a constant rate of 
emissions may be considered as a case of a discrete choice. They have also focused on 
uncertainties not only in damage costs but also in abatement costs claiming that the extent 
                                                 
1 The cost functions may not behave well or may not satisfy the conditions of convexity or concavity. In 
the case of the damage cost function this may take place by threshold effects as well as by any 
irreversibility where pollution reaches a critical point at which the receptor (rivers, lakes, etc) is damaged 
completely and cannot sustain any life. If one or both of the cost functions are not well behaved then our 
results will be different. At the same time the distinction between flow and stock pollutants is important as 
for stock pollutants the persistence has to be taken into consideration due to the accumulation (and decay) 
of pollutant(s) in time (Perman et al., 2011). As an example, we may consider the case of F-Gases with the 
very high global warming potentials (Halkos, 2010). 
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of uncertainties in the control costs are similarly important. They find a remarkable 
insensitivity to uncertainties for continuous choices claiming that for NOX and SO2 an 
error by a factor of 3 will raise total social cost by a maximum of 20%. For dioxins and 
CO2 uncertainties of damage costs are larger compared to the case of NOX and SO2. 
Similarly in the case of discrete choices there is no general conclusion and there is a cost 
penalty only in the case of wrong choice with the difference between abatement and 
damage costs to be higher than the uncertainties.  
Exploration of resources, extraction and processing may cause environmental 
damages like habitat disruption from exploration and drilling activities, oil spills, water 
and air pollution etc (Litman, 2013). In the case of US oil spills cleanup and damage-
compensation  costs were around $300 per barrel in the case of 1979 Ixton I spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico and around $25,000 per barrel for the 1980 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska 
(Cohen, 2010a). These costs are undervalued as a number of ecosystem services are 
difficult to be estimated. According to various surveys wildlife damages were almost $3 
billion compared to around $1.0 billion in total wildlife cleanup and compensation costs 
(Cohen, 2010a). This implies that total damage costs and willingness to pay of the society 
to avoid damages are a lot higher (2 to 5 times) compared to the financial costs imposed 
by the oil industry (Cohen, 2010b). 
Resources exploration, extraction and processing together with distribution may 
cause health problems to people like accidents or pollution related health illness. In 2006 
workers in petroleum production faced almost 21 fatalities per 100,000 workers, a 
number much higher compared to the typical service industry but lower than the other 
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heavy industries like coal miners (almost 50) and loggers (around 87.5) (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2007). 
Table 1 presents the number of cases in Europe and Denmark related to the 
impacts of Danish anthropogenic emissions for the year 2000 as presented in Brandt et al. 
(2013). The total health-related external costs with respect to impacts in the whole of 
Europe due to Danish emissions and for the year 2000 are estimated to be 4.9 bn € per 
year, of which 817 million € per year account for the external costs in Denmark alone. It 
is also shown that the major Danish contributors are agriculture (43%), road traffic 
(18%), power production (10%), non-industrial (domestic) combustion plants including 
wood combustion (9%) and other mobile sources (8%).  
Table 1: Number of cases of different health impacts related to Danish anthropogenic 
emissions for the year 2000 
 
Health impact 
Number of cases 
(in Europe) 
Number of cases 
(in Denmark) 
Chronic Bronchitis  4350  802 
Restricted Activity Days  4 440 000 820 000 
Respiratory Hospital Admissions 234 44 
Congestive Heart Failure  324 69 
Lung Cancer  666 123 
Bronchodilator Use Children  128 000  21 600 
Bronchodilator Use Adults 851 000  157 000 
Cough Children  441 000  74 600 
Cough Adults  876 000  162 000 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms Children  170 000  52 800 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms Adults  316 000  58 300 
Infant mortality  5 1 
Total  7277220 1355951 
Source: Modified from Brandt et al. (2013) 
 
These figures are compared to a higher difference of approximately 15% (impact 
in Europe) and 19% (impacts in Denmark), that is costs of 5.68 billion € and 971 million 
€ per year, when the sum of individual assessments is considered. This difference may be 
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justified from the atmospheric chemical regime in the region of interest. In general and in 
cases where non-linear processes are involved, the sum of individual processes is 
expected to be different compared to all processes together (Brandt et al., 2013). 
Litman (2013) provides estimates of US external costs of petroleum production, 
importation and distribution of $90-160 per barrel and a total of $635-1.080 billion 
yearly. This implies that the internal cost of every $ spend by consumers on petroleum 
imposes $0.63-1.08 in terms of external costs. In these external cost the estimated costs 
of uncompensated environmental damage (ground and surface water pollution, 
production, loss and aesthetic degradation) range from $10 - 30 billions.  
Concerning air pollution and in the case of GHGs the first CBA was carried out 
by Nordhaus (1991).  As found in Tol (2013) there are 16 studies and 17 estimates of the 
global welfare impacts of climate change (Nordhaus 1994a,b, 2006, 2008, 2011; 
Fankhauser, 1994, 1995;  Tol, 1995, 2002a,b; Bosello et al., 2012; Maddison, 2003; 
Mendelsohn et al., 2000a,b; Maddison and Rehdanz, 2011; Rehdanz and Maddison, 
2005). The welfare effect of doubling the atmospheric concentration of GHGs is 
relatively small   (just a small percentage of GDP).  
Tol (2013) presents a list of 75 studies with 588 estimates of the social cost of 
carbon emissions. He applies a kernel density estimator to the 588 observations expressed 
in 2010 US$ and pertaining to emissions in 2010. Tol finds that the mean marginal cost 
of carbon estimated value in these studies equals to $196 per metric tone of carbon with a 
mode estimate of $49/tC. This implies a high asymmetry due to some very high estimates 
explained mainly by the use of different pure rates of time preference. A higher rate of 
time preference indicates that the costs of climate change taking place in the future have a 
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lower present value. Tol extracts a mean social cost of carbon for the studies with 3% and 
0% rate of time preference equal to $25/tC and $296/tC respectively. 
Recently, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (2009) estimated the 
social cost of carbon (including control of emissions costs) in a range between £35 and 
£140 per tonne of CO2. Miyoshi and Mason (2013) present the estimated marginal 
damage cost of CO2 for Manchester Airport. Specifically, in the case of the central price 
of carbon (£51/t), the total damage cost caused by carbon dioxide produced by 
passengers’ surface access is almost £11 m (in 2009 prices) while the cost of CO2 due to 
‘drop off and pick up’ users is almost £0.72 per passenger compared with £0.62 for ‘taxi’, 
£0.41 for ‘car and parking’ and £0.77 for ‘minicab’ users. Given that the average number 
of occupants is around 3.8, this implies a damage cost of CO2 per trip for ‘drop off and 
pick up’ users equal to around £2.74 compared with £0.87 for ‘car and parking’, £3.23 
for ‘minicab’ and £2.48 for ‘taxi’ users.  
Damage costs estimates can be also found among others in three well-known 
integrated assessment models (IAMs): the Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy 
(DICE), the Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE), and the Climate 
Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND). For emission 
changes taking place in 2010, the value of the central social cost of carbon (hereafter 
SCC) is $21/t of CO2 emissions increasing to $26/t of CO2 in 2020 (Greenstone et al., 
2013). 
Each of the three models is given equal weight in the SCC values developed by 
the interagency group. A number of simplifying assumptions and judgments underlie the 
three IAMs, reflecting the modellers’ best attempts to synthesize the available scientific 
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and economic research. Although the frameworks of other IAMs may better reflect the 
complexity of the science, they do not link physical impacts to economic damages, an 
essential step for estimating the social cost of carbon. 
Nordhaus (1994a) presents estimates of the percentage loss in gross world 
product, while Roughgarden and Schneider (1999) relying on Nordhaus’ survey, together 
with other surveys, constructed confidence intervals for a damage function. Similarly 
Heal and Kriström (2002) and Pizer (2006) assess uncertainty using subjective analysis 
and the opinions of experts. Specifically Pizer (2003) modified the DICE model 
developed by Nordhaus (1994b) replacing the original quadratic relationship between 
damage and temperature change with a more complex function. The main conclusion 
from the empirical studies so far is that although there is a level of uncertainty we are 
unable to quantify it. 
In terms of marginal damages of pollutants, Nordhaus (2008) presents a range of 
between $6 and $65/t carbon with a central estimate of $27. Interagency Working Group 
on Social Cost of Carbon (2010) provides a three model mean cost of $21/t, as well as a 
$65/t in the 95th% estimate. These are in line with the estimates by Nordhaus (2008). 
 
3.  Determining the optimal level of pollution 
 Economic theory suggests that the optimal pollution level occurs when the marginal 
damage cost equals the marginal abatement cost. Graphically the optimal pollution level is 
presented in Figure 1 where the marginal abatement (MAC=g(z)) and the marginal damage 
(MD=φ(z)) are represented as typical mathematical cost functions. The point of intersection 
of the two curves, I=I(zo, ko), reflects the optimal level of pollution with k0 corresponding 
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to the optimum cost (benefit) and z0 to the optimum damage restriction. It is assumed (and 
we shall investigate the validity of this assumption in the sequence) that the curves have an 
intersection and the area created by these curves (region AIB) is what we define as Benefit 
Area (Kneese, 1972, among others).  
Our previous analysis (Halkos and Kitsos, 2005) examined only three cases for 
the abatement cost function MAC=g(z):  
- Linear [MAC(z)=β0+β1z, β1≠0];  
- Quadratic [MAC(z)=β0+β1z+β2z
2,   β2 > 0];  
- Exponential [MAC(z) = ze 10
ββ ,  β1 ≠ 0]  
and linearity for the marginal damage cost function (MD(z)=φ(z)= α+βzo). We briefly 
review it, so that the extensions to be more clear, and cover all the possible, in practice, 
cases. 
Under these assumptions the extracted benefit areas were calculated. We shall 
examine in the sequence of this paper how this crucial benefit area can be evaluated, 
providing an index, when different areas are investigated (like countries or provinces), 
adopting different rival models and policies as are expressed by the two curves under 
consideration. 
          Let A and B be the points of the intersection of the curves MD and MAC (see 
Figure 1) with the ‘Y-axis”. Obviously we are restricted to positive values. For these 
points A=A(0, a) and Β=Β(0, b) the values of  a and b are the constant terms of the 
assumed curves that approach MD and MAC respectively. For the linear case we have  
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A=A(0, α) and Β=Β(0, β0) (see Figure 1) and it is assumed that α>β0 in Figure 1, 
provided that MAC is an increasing function and MD is a decreasing one.2  
Costs    
                        Y  
                                                                                              
 
                                                                                             g(z)=MAC 
                                                                                                           
          A=A(0,α) 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                                        I 
                      k0            
 
 
          
 
 
                                                                                                                  φ(z)=MD 
      B=B(0,β0)                 
 
   Z′                  O                                           z0                                        C                       Z   
                                                                                                                               Damage reduction                                                        
 
           Y′ 
              
Figure 1: Graphical presentation of the optimal pollution level (general case) 
 
Specifically, we are now considering a number of cases in order to examine under 
what restrictions the two curves have an intersection, which is presented as I =I(z0, k0). 
That is the equivalent mathematical problem is:  what are the values of the points z0 and 
k0 in order to have the optimal damage restriction and the corresponding value of the 
                                                 
2 This is clear as if it is assumed that α<β0 there is no intersection (no benefit area) and if we let α=βο the 
benefit area coincides with the point, namely A=B=I, that is a one point area is created. 
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optimal cost respectively. It is clear that, in principle, the intersection satisfies that 
MAC(z0)=g(z0)=φ(z0)=MD(z0), with z0 being the optimal restriction in damages. We are 
emphasizing that the coefficients of the abatement cost functions (β0, β1, β2) can be 
estimated by applying the OLS method to the appropriate dataset (Hutton and Halkos, 
1995). Let us examine each assumption and case in turn.         
Case 1: MD and MAC functions are both linear 
In the case of linearity of both MAC and MD the intersection I=I(z0, k0) satisfies 
the following relationship:  β0+β1zo=α+βzo  and therefore z0 can be evaluated as: 
                                    
ββ
αβ
ββ
αβ
−
−
−=
−
−
=
1
0
1
0
0z     (1) 
Now we are asking for z0 to be positive, i.e. to lie on the right half of z
′z axis as in Figure 
1. If both g(z) and φ(z) are linear the intersection exists at z0 as in (1) if β1>β as already 
α>β0. The corresponding optimal cost or benefit values should be equal for both curves.  
0 0
0
1 1
k
β α β α
φ α β
β β β β
 − −
= = + − − 
 or 0 00 0 1
1 1
k g
β α β α
β β
β β β β
 − −
= = + − − 
 
This is true as their difference is zero. The benefit area, BA, is evaluated, in principle, 
through the following relation: 
     BA = (ABI)=(AIz00)-(BIz00)    (2) 
Where in parenthesis are the corresponding evaluated areas of Figure 1.  
The benefit area for the case linear-linear (LL), BALL, can be evaluated as the area 
of the triangle ABI, namely:                  
BALL = 
)(2
)(
2
)0)((
2
))((
)(
1
2
0000
ββ
βαβα
−
−
=
−
==
zIkAB
ABI                 (3) 
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Similarly, using (2) the area can be evaluated by subtraction of the areas of the two 
trapezoidals ending up to expression (3) (for details see Halkos and Kitsos. 2005). 
Case 2:   MD linear and MAC quadratic functions 
Let us consider now the case of a quadratic abatement cost function, which is the 
most likely case, i.e. g(z)=MAC(z)=β0+β1z+β2z
2. It is assumed that b=MAC(0)=β0>0 and 
02
)(
21 >+= z
dz
zdg
ββ , i.e. positive marginal abatement cost, that is 
2
1
2β
β
−>z , which 
also means that g is increasing. The intersection point with the marginal damage can be 
evaluated as:    
MAC(z0) = MD(z0) ⇒ β0+β1z0+β2zo
2 = α+βz0 .  
Recall that for the points A=A(0, a), Β=Β(0, b), and a=α and b= βο, we assume that α>β0 , 
therefore we have 
 (β0-α)+(β1- β)z0 +β2z0
2 = 0    (4) 
If we set K= β0-α, L= β1- β then (4) becomes:  β2z0
2 +Lz0
 +K = 0, with roots : 
            
2
0
2β
DL
z
±−
= ,    D= (β1-β)
2-4β2(β0-α)≥0          (5) 
Actually the negative D has no economical meaning, so a zero D, leads from (4) 
to a double or unique optimal restriction of damages of the form: 
   
2
1
2
0
22 β
ββ
β
−
−=−=
L
z     (6) 
When assuming β1 < β the value of z0 is positive, as β2 has been assumed positive 
already. Thus the corresponding k0 value, for the evaluated z0 is:     
k0=
2
1
0
2
)(
β
ββ
βαϕ
−
−=z     or       
2
1 1
0 0 0 1 2
2 2
( )
2 2
k g z
β β β β
β β β
β β
   − −
= = + − + −   
   
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 Under the assumptions of β0–α<0 and β2>0 the quantity –4β2(β0–α)>0 and 
therefore the value of the determinant is D>0. This is true because the sum of the roots 
(equals to 2z0) is positive, while the product of the roots (equals to [(β0–α)/β2]) is 
negative. We are interested for at least a positive root z0 in (4), which under the 
assumption α>β0 can be evaluated only when β1<β and eventually from (5) we choose the 
positive z0. 
The corresponding benefit area for linear MD and quadratic MAC case, BALQ, is 
evaluated through the general form (2) subtracting from the trapezoidal AIzo0 the area 
BIz00, namely: 
BALQ = [ ])0()(
2
)(
)()0(
2
)()(
00
0
0
0
0
0
GzGz
zg
dzzgz
IzOA
z
−−
+
=−
+
∫
α
    (7)  
with     
32
)(
3
2
2
10
zz
zzG βββ ++=   
which implies that G(0)=0. So (7) is reduced to: 
            BALQ )(
2
)(
00
0 zGz
zg
−
+
=
α
,    g(z)=MAC(z)  (8) 
The value of z0 as in (6) and the assumptions β>β1 and  α>β0. That is as in (3) a general 
form for the benefit area was produced, when a linear marginal abatement cost φ(z) was 
examined.  
Case 3:  MD linear and MAC exponential functions 
Let us consider the case of an exponential MAC function, i.e. MAC(z)=β0exp(β1z). In 
such a case b=MAC(0)=βο with a=α and the general line of thought for the intersection 
leads to:  
01
0
z
e
ββ =α+βz0 ⇔ exp(β1z0)=α* + β* z0,   with   α* =
0β
α
, β*=
0β
β
 with β0 ≠0.  
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This results to (Halkos and Kitsos, 2005): 
  β1z0=ln(α
*+β*z0)⇔ )()ln(
1
00
1
0 zFzz =+=
∗∗ βα
β
   (9) 
Now equation (9) is of the form z0=F(z0), can be only solved adopting numerical analysis 
techniques, through the fixed-point theorem (see Ortega and Rheinbolt, 1970; Halkos and 
Kitsos, 2005 for details). That is the iteration formed as: 
=+1,0 nz )ln(
1
,0
1
nz
∗∗ + βα
β
 n=0,1,2…   (10) 
converges to z0, i.e. lim )( 001,0 zFzz n =→+ . Specifically, the optimal restriction of 
damages level, z0, in the exponential case of MAC only approximately can be evaluated 
and therefore the corresponding optimal cost or benefit level is approximately evaluated 
too.3  
The corresponding benefit area (AIB) for the linear-exponential case, BALE, is 
then evaluated through (2) as: 
BALE =(AIz00) [ ])0()(
2
)(
)( 00
0
0
0
GzGz
zg
dzzg
z
−−
+
=− ∫
α
   (11) 
With:       ∫∫ −===−
0
011
0
1
0 1
0
1
1
0
0
00 )1()()0()(
z
zz
z
z
ezdedzeGzG
βββ
β
β
β
β
β
β   (11.1) 
i.e. G(0)=1, while (7) still holds, providing an index for the benefit area for both 
quadratic and exponential cases, but with G(z0) as in (11.1) and z0 approximated as in 
(10).  
 
                                                 
3 Practically that results the value of the difference MAC(z0)-MD(z0) is not zero, but close to zero, with a 
certain accuracy ±ζ, say ζ=10-3 or 10-6. 
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Case 4:  MD quadratic and MAC linear functions 
Let us now consider that   
  
0 1
MAC = ( ) +g z zβ β=   ,   
1
0β ≠        and  2MD = ( ) ,   0φ z z z aα β γ= + + >
     
 
Here the values of a and b, the intersections of MD and MAC with the Y-axis are 
b=MAC(0)=βο and a=MD(0)=γ, see Figures bellow. To insure that an intersection 
between MAC and MD occurs we need the restriction
00 β γ< < . Considering α>0  three 
cases can be discussed, through the determinant of  φ(z), say D, 2 4 .D β αγ= −    If    D=0  
(see  Figure 2),  D>0 (see Figure 3), while the case  D<0 is with no economical interest 
(due to the complex roots). Therefore the two cases are discussed below, while for the 
dual case α<0 see case 4c. 
Case 4a:   20, 4 0.Dα β αγ> = − =  
In such a case there is a double real root for MD(z), say  
1 2 2
β
ρ ρ ρ
α
= = = −  . We 
need the root ρ>0 and hence is required that β <0. To identify the optimal pollution level 
point 
0 0( , )z kΙ  the evaluation of point 0z  
is the one that   
          
2
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2
0 1 0 0
0 0
( ) ( ) =MAC(z )   
                           ( ) ( ) 0
MD(z )= φ z g z z z z
z z
α β γ β β
α β β γ β
= ⇔ + + = +
⇔ + − + − =           (12) 
   
In order relation (12) to provide the unique (double) solution we need the quantity the 
determinant of (12) 2
1 0
( ) 4 ( )D β β α γ β= − − −   to be zero i.e.  D=0 which is equivalent 
to                                  1 1
0 2 2
z
β β β β
α α
− −
= − =                                         (13)  
As 
0
z  is positive and α > 0 we conclude that
1
.β β>  So for   α > 0,  
1
,β β>   
0
0 β γ<<   
we can easily calculate    
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               1 0
0 0 0 1( ) 0
2
k MAC z
β β
β β
α
−
= = + >                       (14) 
and therefore 0 0( , )z kΙ   is well defined. The corresponding Benefit Area (BAQL) in this 
case is   
0 0
2
1 0
0 0
3 23 2
0 0
1 0 1 0 0
0
0
( ) (φ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                    (15)
3 2 3 2
z z
QL
z
z g z dz az z dz
z zz z
z z
β β γ β
α β β γ β α β β γ β
ΒΑ = ΑΒΙ = − = + − + −
 
= + − + − = + − + − 
 
∫ ∫
 
Case 4a 
 
 
Case 4b: 20, 4 0.Dα β αγ> = − >     
 
           In such a case for the two roots 
1 2
,ρ ρ    it is  
1 2 1 2
| | | |,    φ( ) φ( ) 0ρ ρ ρ ρ≠ = =     and 
we suppose 
1 2
0 ,ρ ρ< <  see Figure 3. The fact that D>0 is equivalent to                                      
2
0
2
a
β
γ  < <  
 
, while the minimum value of the ΜD function is 
24
φ
2 4
β αγ β
α α
− − = 
   
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Proposition 1: The following order for the roots and the value which provides the 
minimum (see Figure 3) is true under the relation   β<0<αγ<  
 
2
β
2
     (16)  
Proof 
The order of the roots 0<ρ1<ρ2 is equivalent to the set of relations: 
              1 20,          φ 0,            φ(0) 0,       0<
2 2
D
ρ ρβ
α α
α
+ > − < > 
 
.                      (16.1) 
The first is valid, as we have assumed D > 0. For the imposed second relation from (16.1) 
we have
                   
24
φ 0     0    0
2 4
aβ γ β
α α
α α
− − < ⇔ < ⇔ ∆ > 
 
,  
which holds. As both the roots are positive 
1 2
, 0ρ ρ >  ,   then the product   
1 2
0ρ ρ >     
therefore  0    0
γ
αγ
α
> ⇔ >   which is valid as  
2
0
2
a
β
γ  < <  
 
 .  The third relation   
φ(0) 0,α α= > in (16.1) is true already and   1 20 0
2 2
ρ ρ β
α
+
< ⇒ < −   equivalent to β < 0.  
Therefore we get    
2
0
2
a
β
β γ  < < <  
  .
                                            
 
We can then identify the point of intersection   
0 0 0:   MAC( ) ( )z z MD z=   as 
before. Therefore under (16) and  
1 0
β β>   we evaluate 0k  as in (14) and the Benefit 
Area BAQL can be evaluated as in (15). 
 
 
 
 20 
Case 4b 
           
Let us now consider the case α < 0.  Under this assumption the restriction  D = 0 
is not considered, as the values of  φ(z)  have to be negative. Consider Figure 2, the graph 
of φ(z) will be symmetric around the point C to this in Figure 2. Therefore we consider 
the following case. 
Case 4c: 20, 4 0Dα β αγ< = − >         
Under the assumption of Case 4c, the value 
24
φ
2 4
β αγ β
α α
− − = 
 
   corresponds 
to the maximum value of φ(z). We consider the situation where  
1 20
2
β
ρ ρ
α
< < − <
 
(see 
Figure 4) while the case 
1 20
2
β
ρ ρ
α
< < − <   has no particular interest (it can be also 
considered as in case 4b).   
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     Case 4c 
   
                    
Proposition 2:  
For the case 4c as above holds:  
1 20
2
β
ρ ρ
α
< < − <
   
when αγ<0.  
Proof  
The imposed assumption is equivalent to ( )φ 0 0    0α αγ< ⇔ <       true  as      1 2 0ρ ρ <      
2
φ 0   
2 2
β β
α αγ
α
   − < ⇔ <   
   
.Therefore the imposed restrictions are     
2
0
2
β
αγ  < <  
 
                                                                          
Actually    0αγ <   .  In case 4c it is now asked  
0
β γ<    and   0.
1
β >    To calculate  
0
z   
we proceed as in (12) and 
0
z  is evaluated as in (13) with α < 0, therefore 
1
0β β− <   i.e. 
1
β β<  .  Thus for  
1
,    0,β β αγ< <  the BA as in (15) is still valid. 
 
Therefore the following analysis is now considered, extending case 4 of both MD 
and MAC to be quadratic functions.  
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Case 5:   MD and MAC functions both quadratic   
 
 Let us consider that both curves, MAC and MD are  of the second order as   
                     2
0 1 2MAC = ( ) +g z z zβ β β= +          2 0β ≠   (with determinant d)                           
                        
2MD = ( ) ,              0φ z z z aα β γ= + + ≠   (with determinant D) 
In this case the intersections of MAC and MD with the Y-axis are b =MAC(0)=βο and 
a=MD(0)=γ. The following two substances are investigated below.  
Case 5a:  2 4 0,    0D aβ αγ= − = >  and 1 2 0 2
2 4 0,        0,d β β β β≤= − >  see Figure 5. 
For the identification of the optimal pollution level point 
0 0( , )z kΙ  we need to 
estimate 
0
z  such that                                       
                          
2 2
0 0 0 1 0 2 0
2
2 0 1 0 0
0 0
( ) ( )    
                           ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
φ z g z z z z z
z z
α β γ β β β
α β β β γ β
= ⇔ + + = + +
⇔ − + − + − =
            (17) 
When the determinant of this equation δ is  zero,  
2
2 0 )1
( ) 4( )( 0δ β β α β γ β == − − − −  
 the unique root of (17) equals   
                                                             
2
1
0
.
2( )
z
β β
α β
−
= −
−
                                              (18) 
Recall case 2, relation (6). It is asked not only z0 to be positive but to be less than the 
(double) root of MD (see Figure 5), i.e.             
                                          
2
1
0
0 ,
2( ) 2
z
β β β
α β α
−
< = − < −
−
                                                                
Therefore we have the restriction                      
2
1 .
β ββ
α α β
−
<
−
    
Thus the corresponding to the optimal restriction in damage 
0
,z  optimal cost
0
k point is       
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2
1 1
0 0 02
2 2
( )
φ( )
4( )
k z
β β β β
α β γ
α β α β
− −
= = − +
− −
                            (19)               
Thus the corresponding Benefit Area, BAQQ, can be evaluated as  
      
0 3 2
0 0
2 1 0 0
0
              (φ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 2
z
QQ
z z
z g z dz zα β β β γ βΒΑ = − = − + − + −∫         (20) 
Case 5a 
 
 
Another interesting case is the following. 
Case 5b:
 
2 4 0,    0D aβ αγ= − > >  and  1 2 0
2
24 0,   0d β β β β≤= − >   (see Figure 6). 
In this case we need the order of the points to be 
0 1 20
2
z
β
ρ ρ
α
< < < − <  . Recall 
also case 4b (see Figure 6). Therefore we need the following conditions  
φ 0,    
2
β
α
α
 − < 
 
which holds and    ( ) 1 20 00,          φ 0,             z < .
2 2
D z
ρ ρ β
α
α
+
> > = −       
Eventually is needed to have the restrictions             
( )0 0φ 0      and        z < .
2
z
β
α
α
> −                                    
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The point 
0
z  is eventually as in (18) and the corresponding 0k  as in (19) so 0 0( , )z kΙ   is 
identified. The BA is evaluated as in (20).  
             Case 5b 
 
 
 
Case 6:   MD quadratic and MAC exponential functions 
We assume now that MD is quadratic function and MAC is exponential, that is 
 1
0
( ) ( ) e
z
MAC z g z
β
β= =  , β0>0      
2( ) ,       0MD(z)= φ z z z aα β γ= + + >                   
Here b=MAC(0)=βο , and a=MD(0)=γ. In particular we are investigating the following 
sub-cases, which are within our target. 
Case 6a: For MD it is 2 4 0D β αγ= − > , see also Figure 7.                                         
Evaluating I(z0, k0), z0 has to obey to the relationship: 
2 2
0 0 0 0 0
0 01 1
0 0 0
( ) ( )    e    e 0              (21)
z z
φ z g z z z z z
β β
α β γ β α β γ β= ⇔ + + = ⇔ + + − =
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This equation (21) is non-linear so we have to prove that there is one solution, which can 
be evaluated numerically.  
Case 6 
 
Figure 7: , 0
2
C C
β
α
 = − 
    
Proposition 3: There is a z0∈(0, ρ1): MD(z0)=MAC(zo) function 
Proof  
If we consider the equation 
2
1
1 0( ) ( )( )
z
F z z z e
β
α ρ ρ β= − − − then under the imposed 
restrictions  0(0) 0F γ β= − >    as 21
γ
ρ ρ
α
= and  1 11 0( ) 0F e
β ρ
ρ β= − < . Therefore as  
1(0) ( ) 0F F ρ <  there exists a number 0 1 0(0, ) : ( ) 0z F zρ∈ =   and therefore (21) is true 
that is there exists a real solution (root) z0 for it. 
 
The evaluation of the root 0z of (21) can be numerically calculated and one way is 
by adopting the Bisction method. The corresponding  1 0
0 0 0( )
z
k g z e
β
β= =    can be 
easily evaluated, as the corresponding Benefit Area (BAEQ) is calculated as    
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0 3 2
0 0 0
0
10
01(φ( ) ( )) 1                           
3 2
z
EQ
zz z
z g z dz z e
ββ
α β γ
β
 ΒΑ = − = + + − − 
 ∫  (22)  
 The last case is to have both MAC and MD functions exponential as follows. 
 
Case 7: MD and MAC both exponential  functions   
In this case it is assumed that both MB and MAC are exponential of the form 
      
0 0 0
1( ) ( ) e ,   
z
MAC z g z
β
β β >= =     0 0 0   01( ) e ,  
z
MD(z)= φ z
θ
θ θ β> >=               
The target is to evaluate the 0z  point of the optimal pollution level as  
0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0
0 0
0
1 1 0 1 1 0
)
0 0 0
(
1 1 1 1( ) ( )    e e    e       ( ) ln
1 1
                          ln = ln                                                  
( ) ( )
z z z
φ z g z z
z
β θ θ ββ β
β θ θ β
θ θ
β θ
θ β θ β θ β
−
= ⇔ = ⇔ = ⇔ − =
⇔ =
− −
From the above relation it is clear that there is no intersection when 
1 1
θ β= . The 
corresponding Benefit Area (BAEE) is evaluated as  
0
0 0
1 10
0 01 1(φ( ) ( )) 1 1                                (23)                         
z
EE
z z
z g z dz e e
β θβ θ
β θ
   ΒΑ = − = − − −   
   ∫
   
    
Case 7 
       
Figure 8:  θ0>β0,  MAC and MD functions exponential  
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Finally, the case that ( )φ z  is exponential and ( )g z   is of second order is the dual 
of case 6a. In this way we have investigated all possible cases modeling MAC and MD. 
A compact view of all the cases is presented in Table 2.  The results obtained above have 
been adopted in an empirical application discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 2:  The compact presentation of the results 
Case MD=φ(z) MAC=g(z) z0>0 BA Restrictions 
1 α+βz β0 +β1z −
−
−
0
1
β α
β β
 (3) α>β0 
β1>β 
2 α+βz β0 +β1z+β2z
2 
1
22
β β
β
−
−  
(7), (8) β2>0 
> 1β β  
α>β0 
3 α+βz ze 1
β
0β  
Numerically (10) (11) β1>0 
4 αz2+βz+γ β0 +β1z   0<β0<γ 
4a  α>0    D=0    β1>β     β<0   
0<β0<γ 
4b  α>0    D>0  β<0<αγ<(β/2)2 
β1>β0 
4c  α<0    D>0  
 
 
−
=Z 10
β β
2α
 
 
 
 
 
 
(15) 
 
 
β1<β    αγ<0 
5 αz2+βz+γ β0 +β1z+β2z
2   α≠0        β2≠0     
5a α>0    D=0 β2>0    d≤0 
5b  α>0    D>0 β2>0     d≤0 
−
=−
−
Z
1
0
2
β β
2(α β )
 
 
(20) 
 
 
β1 > β    α > β2 
6 αz2+βz+γ ze 1
β
0β  
 (20) β0>0   α>0 
6a α>0, D>0  Numerically (22) γ>β0 
7 ze 1
θ
0θ  
z
e 1
β
0β  = −
z 00
1 1 0
θ1
ln
β θ β
  
(23) 
 
β1≠θ1 
 
4.  An empirical application 
In our empirical application we shall use estimates for the available data for different 
European countries. For this purpose we discuss how the two curves, the abatement cost 
g(z) and the damage cost φ(z), can be approximated.  
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Starting with the abatement cost function these measures the cost of reducing tonnes of 
emissions of a pollutant, like sulphur (S), and differs from country to country depending on 
the local costs of implementing best practice abatement techniques as well as on the 
existing power generation technology. For abating sulphur emissions various control 
methods exist with different cost and applicability levels  (Halkos 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997):  
(a) gas oil desulphurisation,  
(b) heavy fuel oil desulphurisation,  
(c) hard coal washing,  
(d) in furnace direct limestone injection,  
(e) flue gas desulphurisation and  
(f) fluidised bed combustion.  
To calculate total emissions from each source (TEp) the annual emissions for a given 
pollutant in each sector for each European country are calculated. Total emissions are then 
determined as:   TEp = Σ [PRijt x (1-αt) Εpij x ARijtf]   (24) 
where i stands for country, j for sector, t for technology, f for fuel and p for pollutant. 
Similarly, PR stands for production levels; αt for the abatement efficiency of method t and 
AR for the application rate (Halkos, 2010). 
 In the same way, given the generic engineering capital and operating control cost 
functions for each efficient abatement technology, total and marginal costs of different 
levels of pollutant’s reduction at each individual source and in the national (country) level 
can be constructed. According to Halkos (1993, 1995, 2010), the cost of an emission 
abatement option is given by the total annualized cost (TAC) of this abatement option, 
including capital and operating cost components. Specifically:  
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   ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ } FOMC+VOMC+r+rTCC=TAC n−− 11/    (25) 
Where TCC is the total capital cost; VOMC and FOMC stand for the variable and fixed 
operating and maintenance cost respectively; r/[1-(1+r)-n] is the capital recovery factor at 
real discount rate r, which converts a capital cost to an equivalent stream of equal annual 
future payments, considering the time value of money (represented by r). Finally, n 
stands for the economic life of the asset (in years). 
For every European country a least cost curve is derived by finding the 
technology on each pollution source with the lowest marginal cost per tone of pollutant 
removed in the country and the amount of pollutant removed by that method on that 
pollution source. In this way the first step on the country’s abatement curve is 
constructed. Iteratively the next highest marginal cost is found and is added to the 
country curve with the amount of pollutant (say sulphur) removed on the X-axis. In the 
national cost curve each step corresponds to a control measure that leads to an emission 
reduction of an extra unit at the least cost. Figure 9 presents the steps in deriving control 
cost curves; while Figure 10 shows the Total and Marginal Abatement Cost curves for 
Austria in the year 2000.  
 For analytical purposes, it is important to approximate the cost curves of each 
country adopting a functional form. Extending the mathematical models described above 
to stochastic models (as the error term from the Normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance σ2) we have found that least squares equations of the form 
   g(z)= 0 1i i i iAC = + SRβ β +εi       (26.1)     
or    g(z)= 20 1 2i i i i iAC = + SRSRβ β β+ +εi      (26.2) 
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lead to satisfactory approximations for all the countries analyzed in this paper4. In these 
equations SRi represents sulphur removed in country i, ACi abatement cost in country i and 
εi the disturbance term with the usual hypotheses (Halkos, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 9:  Steps in constructing Abatement Cost Curves 
 
 
                                                 
4 Equations were fitted across the range 5-55% of maximum feasible abatement. The estimated coefficients 
of both specifications were statistically significant in all cases with only exception in the estimate of β1 in 
the quadratic specification of Spain.  
 
Source: Halkos (2010) 
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Figure 10: Total and Marginal Abatement Cost curves for Austria in the year 2000 
    
                   
                              
 
Source: Modified form Halkos (1992) 
 
 Next, the calculation of the damage function φ(z) is necessary. The problem of 
estimating damage cost functions is a lot more difficult compared to the estimation of 
abatement costs, as the effects of pollution cannot be identified with any accuracy and 
sometimes it takes a long time to realize the consequences. In our case and in order to 
extract the damage estimates we use the case of acidification which is related to 
transboundary pollution, requiring that the model takes account of the distribution of the 
externality among the various countries (victims).  
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 Each country receives a certain number of pollutant’s units whose deposition is 
due to the other countries' emissions as well as to its own emissions. The deposition of 
sulphur in country i is given by  
   Di = Bi+dii(1-αi)Ei+Σi≠jdij(1-αj)Ej = Bi+Σjdij(1-αj)Ej   (27) 
where Ej is the total annual sulphur emission in country j; Di is the total Annual sulphur 
Deposition in country i; αi is the abatement efficiency coefficient in country i and dij is 
the transfer coefficient from country j to i, indicating what proportions of emissions from 
any source country is ultimately deposited in any receiving country; Bi is the level of the 
so-called background deposition attributable to natural sources (such as volcanoes, forest 
fires, biological decay, etc) in receptor-country i, or to pollution remaining too long in the 
atmosphere to be tracked by the model, i.e. is probably attributable not only to natural 
sources but also to emissions whose origin cannot be determined. This assignment is 
summarized in the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme transfer coefficient 
matrix (EMEP). 
Due to difficulties, we do not directly estimate the damage function, but instead 
we infer its parameters assuming that countries currently equate national marginal 
damage cost with national marginal abatement cost5. The restrictions on the derivatives 
of the damage cost function are important. The total cost resulting from a specific level of 
pollutant (like sulphur) for country i is,   
 TCi = abatement cost + damage cost = ACi + DCi.    
                                                 
5 Rabl et al. (2013) approximate the damage function by a linear function of the pollution emissions and 
they claim that linearity is found to be appropriate approximation in the case of PM, SO2 and NOX 
emissions, while for CO2 linearity is probably acceptable for emissions reductions in the “foreseeable” 
future period. 
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As mentioned, abatement costs are estimated by linear and quadratic functions of sulphur 
removed (as in 26.1 and 26.2) and we also assume that damage costs are linear and 
quadratic in deposits. Damage depends on deposits, which depend on the [dij] matrix as 
explained before. In the more complex case of both quadratic abatement and damage cost 
functions the total cost function may be expressed as:  
TCi = [β0i + β1i SRi + β2i SRi
2] + [γ0i + γ1i Di + γ2i Di
2]       i=1,2,…,n (28) 
It follows that total cost is minimized when  
γ1i = [(β1i+2β2iSRi-2γ2idii
2SRi)/dii]    and  γ2i=[(β1i+2β2iSRi-γ1idii)/2dii
2 SRi]    
where dii the transfer coefficient
6.   
This is the only information available to "calibrate" the damage function, on the 
assumption that national authorities act independently (as Nash partners in a non-
cooperative game with the rest of the world), taking as given deposits originating in the 
rest of the world. If we assume linear abatement and quadratic damage cost functions 
then   γ1i= (β1i-2γ2idii
2 SRi)/dii  and   γ2i=[(β1i-γ1idii)/2dii
2 SRi]   
Finally in the case of linearity for both abatement and damage cost functions γ1i=β1i/dii.  
Table 3 presents the estimated damage and abatement cost coefficients in the 
more complex case of assuming both cost functions are quadratic7. Similarly, Table 4 
presents the corresponding “calibrated” Benefit Area (BAc) indexes evaluated from the 
available parameter estimates in the case of linear-quadratic (LQ) and quadratic-
quadratic (QQ) damage and abatement cost functions respectively for 20 European 
countries.8 In the first of the two case studies the associated efficiency index9 is 
                                                 
6 If like Mӓler (1989, 1990) and Newbery (1990) we set γ2i=0 then γ1i =(β1i+2β2iSRi)/dii. 
7 Estimates of c0 were derived by assuming countries act in a Nash behavior.  
8 The empirical results presented are indicative and very sensitive to the assumptions of calibration.  
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presented10. This is a measure of what percentage of the adopted policy covers that policy 
which provides the maximum benefit area. Similarly, the evaluation of the optimal 
damage reduction, z0 as has been denoted in this paper, provides evidence, that the larger 
it is the better the adopted environmental policy.  
As it can be seen, countries with high optimal damage reductions are the UK and 
France (in both cases LQ and QQ) and Former Czechoslovakia, Spain and Turkey (in the 
LQ case). On the other hand, countries with low damage reductions are Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Romania (in the case of LQ cost functions), Finland, Sweden, Turkey (in the case 
of QQ) and Norway and Switzerland in both cases. Large industrial upwind counties (like 
Denmark, France and the UK) seem to have a very large benefit area. Looking at the 
EMEP transfer coefficients matrix it can be seen that the countries with large benefit 
areas are those with large numbers on the diagonal. This shows the importance of the 
domestic sources of pollution. The large off-diagonal transfer coefficients indicate in 
general the major effects of one country on another, and especially the externalities 
imposed by the Eastern European countries on the others.  
Similarly downwind or near to the sea countries seem to have small benefit areas. 
Additionally, the damage caused by acidification depends on where the depositions 
occur. In the case of occurrence over the sea it is less likely to have much harmful effect, 
as the sea is naturally alkaline. In the same way, if it occurs over sparsely populated areas 
with acid tolerant soils then the damage is low (Newbery, 1990).  
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Following Halkos and Kitsos (2005) the efficiency (Eff) of the benefit area, in comparison with the 
maximum evaluated from the sample of countries under investigation, can be estimated using as measure of 
efficiency the expression:    Eff =  [
BA
BA
max
] *100   
10 Germany dominates the picture in Europe as it has a very high initial abatement level (≈42%) and its 
calibrated damage function ensures high abatement levels (Hutton and Halkos, 1995). For this reason the 
efficiency index was constructed on the second highest benefit area (former Czechoslovakia).  
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Table 3: Coefficient estimates in the case of quadratic MD and MAC functions 
Countries c0 c1 c2 b0 b1 b2 
Albania 0,7071 0,01888 0,0001397 -3,3818 0,015 0,0048 
Austria 8,57143 0,055012 0,0001145 3,274 -0,221 0,004 
Belgium 2,2424 0,03869 0,0001688 0,497 -0,124 0,003 
 Former Czechoslovakia 37,794 0,100323 0,000059 11,241 0,2358 0,00018 
Denmark 10 0,1923 0,0060811 -2,49 0,099 0,0053 
Finland 4,021 0,0781 0,00014587 2,343 -0,098 0,0046 
France 33,158 0,277352 0,000197 42,374 -0,053 0,0018 
Greece 3,7373 0,034133 0,0000491 -1,614 0,342 0,0006 
Hungary 5,101 0,031488 0,0000417 2,506 0,216 0,0004 
Italy 21,01 0,030036 0,0000191 12,5 0,36 0,0003 
Luxembourg 0,421 0,3161 0,0272381 -0,7272 0,01 0,09234 
Netherlands 8,353 0,19513 0,00351442 -6,18 0,41 0,0009 
Norway 1,421 0,07852 0,00017008 0,94 -0,244 0,0164 
Poland 6,212 0,023153 0,000071 -8,023 0,324 0,00009 
Romania 9,091 0,011364 0,00006237 5,502 0,19 0,0001 
Spain 11,7 0,007288 0,00497419 10,21 -0,021 0,00014 
Sweden 2,4 0,06423 0,0000932 4,074 -0,252 0,004 
Switzerland 2,4 0,56027 0,002803 5,7543 -1,6289 0,11203 
Turkey 14,9 0,01781 0,00001223 8,0622 0,011 0,00036 
UK 19,1 0,06879 0,0000467 15,54 0,0264 0,0003 
 
 
Table 4: Calculated “calibrated” Benefit Areas (BAc)  
 Linear - Quadratic Quadratic-Quadratic 
Countries D z0 g(z0) G(z0) BA Eff z0 BA 
Albania 0,07852 29,594 -3,38 -52,05 81,24 3,5872 0,416282 1,460084   
Austria 0,160942 84,649 3,3 294,1 628,6 27,756 35,51795 34,38386 
Belgium 0,047413 63,406 0,5 37,2 182,8 8,0715 28,73163 58,58427 
Former Czechoslovakia 0,037791 160,988 11,24 5119,8 2264,6 100   
Denmark 0,273493 58,138 -2,5 369,72 536,7 23,698 -507,79 66016,29   
Finland 0,061886 46,182 2,4 154,72 114,3 5,0453 19,76705 1,578593 
France 0,042777 149,22 42,4 7726,3 309,2 13,65 103,0412 950,4364 
Greece 0,107625 16,83 -1,62 22,23 45,5 2,0095   
Hungary 0,038197 13,66 2,51 54,72 17,9 0,7901   
Italy 0,119088 25,22 12,5 431,19 108,1 4,7726   
Luxembourg 0,517796 5,56 -0,73 1,4 5,8 0,2572 2,351007 2,359444 
Netherlands 0,098488 54,98 -6,18 329,7 424,4 18,741 -73,6549 85,02478 
Norway 0,135573 21,056 0,94 16,75 30,6 1,3508 9,93597 2,085391 
Poland 0,095634 46,67 -8,03 -18,57 333,7 14,734   
Romania 0,033347 19,87 5,5 147,1 35,8 1,5803   
Spain 0,001635 245,43 10,2 2563,2 527,8 23,305 -2,92603 11,43726 
Sweden 0,073218 73,35 4,1 147,1 201,7 8,9075 40,47174 55,68209 
Switzerland 3,289337 17,87 5,56 55,8 76,5 3,378 10,02119 24,05788 
Turkey 0,009866 147,82 8,1 1698,5 698,65 30,851 9,819189 58,17368 
UK  0,006069 200,5 15,6 4452,1 759,9 33,551 83,67548 1813,895 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 The analysis of the effectiveness of environmental programs and regulations 
requires the comparison of damage and control costs associated with the reduction of 
different pollutants. It is worth mentioning that although there is an obvious uncertainty 
in damage costs we cannot ignore that uncertainty is also present in the abatement cost 
functions due to abatement efficiencies that may differ between countries and between 
adopted scenarios.  
 The typical approach to define the optimal pollution level has been to equate the 
marginal damage of an extra unit of pollution with the corresponding marginal abatement 
cost. An efficient level of emissions maximizes the net benefit that is the difference 
between abatement and damage costs. Therefore the identification of this efficient level 
shows the level of benefits maximization, which is the output level resulting if external 
costs (damages) are fully internalized.  
 In this paper the corresponding optimal cost and benefit points were evaluated 
analytically. It is shown that this is feasible in the linear and quadratic cases while in the 
exponential case only approximated values can be obtained. The explicit evaluation of 
the benefit area was also discussed and analytical forms for this particular area were 
calculated for different policies. In this way the optimal level was also evaluated.  
 We show that the optimal pollution level can be evaluated only under certain 
conditions as were derived is section 3. Specifically, it is required that in all of the cases 
α>βο if we assume that MAC is an increasing function and MD is a decreasing function. 
That is, the constant term in the damage cost function (we may think of the background 
deposition) is bigger than the abatement cost at level z=0 (we may think of fixed costs of 
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operating an abatement method at level z=0).  In cases of both linear or both quadratic 
functions we have β>β1. That is the slope of the benefit function must be greater than the 
marginal abatement cost at level z=0. For the quadratic case it is required that β2>0 while 
for the exponential case β0, β1>0.  Both the quadratic and the exponential cases obey to 
the same form of evaluating the benefit area.  
 From our empirical findings is clear that the evaluation of the “calibrated” Benefit 
Area, as it was developed, provides an index to compare the different policies adopted 
from different countries on the basis of how large calibrated Benefit Area provides 
eventually. In this way a comparison of different policies can be performed. Certainly the 
policy with the maximum Benefit Area is the best, and the one with the minimum is the 
worst. Clearly the index BAc provides a new measure for comparing the adopted policies.  
 An important finding (in the case of transboundary pollution) is that domestic 
pollution sources are important while big industrial upwind counties seem to have a very 
large benefit area. On the other hand, downwind near to the sea countries or over sparsely 
populated areas with acid tolerant soils seem to have small benefit areas. As mentioned 
the empirical results derived are only indicative and very sensitive to the assumptions of 
calibration. 
 Policy makers may have multiple objectives with efficiency and sustainability to be 
of high priority. Environmental policies should consider that economic development is 
not uniform across regions and may differ significantly (Halkos and Tzeremes, 2010). At 
the same time reforming economic policies to cope with EU enlargement may face 
problems and this may in turn affect their economic efficiencies (Halkos and Tzeremes, 
2009).   
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